Trust Assessment
reactome-database received a trust score of 68/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 4 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Suspicious import: requests, Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Covert behavior / concealment directives.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 11, 2026 (commit 458b1186). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings4
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Path Traversal Vulnerability in File Reading The `command_analyze` function in `scripts/reactome_query.py` directly uses the `gene_file` argument in an `open()` call without any path sanitization or validation. This allows an attacker to specify arbitrary file paths (e.g., `../../../etc/passwd`) to read local files on the system where the script is executed. If the LLM is prompted to execute this script with user-controlled input for `gene_file`, it could lead to data exfiltration. Implement robust input validation for the `gene_file` argument. This should include checking for directory traversal sequences (e.g., `..`), absolute paths, and ensuring the file is within an expected, restricted directory. For example, use `os.path.basename()` to only allow filenames, or `os.path.join()` with a secure base directory. | Static | scripts/reactome_query.py:158 | |
| MEDIUM | Suspicious import: requests Import of 'requests' detected. This module provides network or low-level system access. Verify this import is necessary. Network and system modules in skill code may indicate data exfiltration. | Static | cli-tool/components/skills/scientific/reactome-database/scripts/reactome_query.py:24 | |
| MEDIUM | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/figma-dev-mode.json:4 | |
| LOW | Covert behavior / concealment directives Multiple zero-width characters (stealth text) Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/jfrog.json:4 |
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