Security Audit

task-execution-engine

github.com/davila7/claude-code-templates

AI SkillCommit 458b11867eae

TRUSTED

Scanned 11 days ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

task-execution-engine received a trust score of 75/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Covert behavior / concealment directives, Arbitrary File Read/Write via Unvalidated Path.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 458b1186). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

91%

Static Code Analysis

85%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

100%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Security Findings3

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Arbitrary File Read/Write via Unvalidated Path The `scripts/task_manager.py` script directly uses the `--file` argument from command-line input to read from and write to files without sufficient path validation. A malicious actor could craft a prompt injection to the host LLM, causing it to invoke this skill with a manipulated `--file` argument (e.g., `--file /etc/passwd` or `--file ../../../.ssh/id_rsa`). This vulnerability allows for reading sensitive system files (data exfiltration) or overwriting/corrupting arbitrary files on the system, leading to data integrity issues or denial of service. Implement strict path validation for the `--file` argument. Ensure the path is canonicalized and restricted to an allowed, non-sensitive directory (e.g., `docs/designs/`) using an allowlist approach. Prevent directory traversal (`..`) and absolute paths outside the designated working directory. For example, resolve the path relative to a secure base directory and verify it remains strictly within that directory before any file operations.	Static	scripts/task_manager.py:175
MEDIUM	Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains.	Manifest	cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/figma-dev-mode.json:4
LOW	Covert behavior / concealment directives Multiple zero-width characters (stealth text) Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users.	Manifest	cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/jfrog.json:4

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