Trust Assessment
yeet received a trust score of 60/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 1 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Covert behavior / concealment directives, Command Injection via unsanitized user input in shell commands.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 458b1186). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Command Injection via unsanitized user input in shell commands The skill instructs the LLM to construct and execute shell commands using a `{description}` variable. If this variable is populated directly from untrusted user input without proper shell escaping or sanitization, it can lead to arbitrary command execution. Specifically, the commands `git checkout -b "codex/{description}"` and `git commit -m "{description}"` are vulnerable. A malicious user could inject shell metacharacters (e.g., `;`, `&`, `|`, `$()`) into the `{description}` to execute arbitrary commands on the host system, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system modification, or denial of service. The LLM must ensure that any user-provided input used to populate the `{description}` variable is thoroughly sanitized and shell-escaped before being interpolated into shell commands. For `git commit -m`, ensure the message is passed as a single, properly quoted argument. For branch names, ensure the input conforms to valid git branch name rules and is shell-escaped to prevent shell metacharacter interpretation. | Static | SKILL.md:16 | |
| MEDIUM | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/figma-dev-mode.json:4 | |
| LOW | Covert behavior / concealment directives Multiple zero-width characters (stealth text) Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users. | Manifest | cli-tool/components/mcps/devtools/jfrog.json:4 |
Scan History
Embed Code
[](https://skillshield.io/report/42e9847d0af5bc5c)
Powered by SkillShield