Trust Assessment
clawdbot-release-check received a trust score of 80/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 3 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME, User-controlled input embedded in LLM-interpreted payload.
The analysis covered 4 layers: dependency_graph, llm_behavioral_safety, manifest_analysis, static_code_analysis. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 0676c56a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME Access to sensitive environment variable '$HOME' detected in shell context. Verify this environment variable access is necessary and the value is not exfiltrated. | Unknown | /var/folders/1k/67b8r20n777f_xcmmm8b7m5h0000gn/T/skillscan-clone-okorckc1/repo/clawdbot/clawdbot-release-check/scripts/check.sh:7 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME Access to sensitive environment variable '$HOME' detected in shell context. Verify this environment variable access is necessary and the value is not exfiltrated. | Unknown | /var/folders/1k/67b8r20n777f_xcmmm8b7m5h0000gn/T/skillscan-clone-okorckc1/repo/clawdbot/clawdbot-release-check/scripts/setup.sh:43 | |
| MEDIUM | User-controlled input embedded in LLM-interpreted payload The `scripts/setup.sh` script constructs a cron job payload in JSON format, which is intended to be interpreted by an LLM-driven gateway. The `channel` and `to` fields within this payload are directly populated by user-controlled command-line arguments (`--channel` and `--telegram`). If the `clawdis` gateway's LLM prompt construction does not adequately sanitize or escape these values before incorporating them into a prompt, a malicious user could inject arbitrary instructions into the LLM by providing specially crafted strings for `--channel` or `--telegram`. This could lead to unintended agent actions, data manipulation, or other security breaches. Implement strict validation for user-provided `--channel` and `--telegram` arguments in `scripts/setup.sh` to ensure they conform to expected formats (e.g., a whitelist of channel names, numeric IDs for Telegram). Additionally, the `clawdis` gateway should implement robust sanitization and escaping mechanisms for all user-controlled fields within LLM prompts to prevent prompt injection. | Unknown | scripts/setup.sh:86 |
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