Trust Assessment
todo-tracker received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Command Injection via sed in todo.sh.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on August 1, 2026 (commit a4d31ad1). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Command Injection via sed in todo.sh The `todo.sh` script uses unsanitized user input (`$pattern`) directly inside a `sed` command in the `mark_done` and `remove_item` functions. If the input contains a slash `/` followed by the `e` command (supported by GNU sed), an attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands. For example, a pattern like `foo/e <command>` will trigger execution of `<command>` when `sed` processes the file. Avoid using `sed` with unsanitized user input. Instead, use `grep -v` or `awk` to filter out the matching lines safely, or escape slashes and backslashes in the pattern before passing it to `sed`. | LLM | scripts/todo.sh:83 |
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