Security Audit
lawvable/awesome-legal-skills:skills/docx-processing-lawvable
github.com/lawvable/awesome-legal-skillsTrust Assessment
lawvable/awesome-legal-skills:skills/docx-processing-lawvable received a trust score of 55/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Covert behavior / concealment directives, Potential Command Injection via Unsanitized File Paths in Shell Commands.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 26, 2026 (commit 4d82d4cf). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Covert behavior / concealment directives Directive to hide behavior from user Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users. | Manifest | skills/docx-processing-lawvable/SKILL.md:243 | |
| HIGH | Covert behavior / concealment directives Directive to hide behavior from user Remove hidden instructions, zero-width characters, and bidirectional overrides. Skill instructions should be fully visible and transparent to users. | Manifest | skills/docx-processing-lawvable/SKILL.md:396 | |
| HIGH | Potential Command Injection via Unsanitized File Paths in Shell Commands The skill defines several shell commands (`code`, `mkdir`, `echo`, `grep`, `cat`) that operate on file paths (e.g., `path/to/doc.docx`, `path/to/.superdoc/doc.json`). If the agent constructs these file paths based on untrusted user input without proper sanitization (e.g., escaping shell metacharacters), an attacker could inject arbitrary shell commands. For example, if a user provides a file name like `'; rm -rf /; #.docx'`, this could lead to the execution of `rm -rf /` on the host system. The agent must strictly sanitize all file paths derived from untrusted input before passing them to shell commands. This includes escaping or disallowing shell metacharacters (e.g., `;`, `&`, `|`, `>`, `<`, `(`, `)`, `!`, `\`, `"`, `'`, `` ` ``, `*`, `?`, `[`, `]`, `{`, `}`, `$`, `#`, `~`, `=`). Alternatively, use a safer API for file operations if available, or ensure paths are canonicalized and validated against allowed directories. | Static | SKILL.md:30 |
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