Trust Assessment
ai-voice-cloning received a trust score of 26/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 2 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Remote code execution: curl/wget pipe to shell, Excessive Bash permission for 'infsh' CLI.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Remote code download piped to interpreter Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/okaris/ai-voice-cloning/SKILL.md:9 | |
| CRITICAL | Remote code execution: curl/wget pipe to shell Detected a pattern that downloads and immediately executes remote code. This is a primary malware delivery vector. Never pipe curl/wget output directly to a shell interpreter. | Static | skills/okaris/ai-voice-cloning/SKILL.md:9 | |
| HIGH | Excessive Bash permission for 'infsh' CLI The skill declares `Bash(infsh *)` as an allowed tool. This permission grants the skill the ability to execute any command starting with `infsh`, followed by any arguments. While the skill's intended use is to run `infsh app run` for voice generation, this broad permission could allow the skill to invoke other `infsh` subcommands that might have unintended side effects, access sensitive information (if `infsh` has such capabilities, e.g., `infsh fs read`), or perform system modifications beyond its scope. Furthermore, if the LLM constructs the `infsh` command string from untrusted user input, this broad permission creates a significant command injection vulnerability, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands by injecting shell metacharacters into the `infsh` command line. Restrict the `Bash` permission to only the necessary `infsh` subcommands and arguments, such as `Bash(infsh app run *)`. If `infsh` commands are complex, consider wrapping them in a more constrained tool or function that strictly validates and sanitizes all inputs before execution. | LLM | SKILL.md |
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