Trust Assessment
backup received a trust score of 94/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unsafe 'tar' extraction in restore script.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Unsafe 'tar' extraction in restore script The `restore_backup` function in the `openclaw-backup.sh` script uses `tar -xzvf "$backup_file" -C "$HOME"` to extract archives. This command is vulnerable to path traversal attacks if `$backup_file` points to a malicious archive. A specially crafted archive could contain entries like `../../.ssh/authorized_keys` which, when extracted, would overwrite files outside the intended `$HOME/.claude` directory, potentially leading to arbitrary file overwrite or privilege escalation. The script does not sanitize the archive contents or explicitly warn the user about this risk. 1. **Warn the user**: Add a prominent warning in the skill documentation about the dangers of restoring backups from untrusted sources. 2. **Validate archive contents**: Before extraction, list the contents of the archive (`tar -tf "$backup_file"`) and check for any suspicious paths (e.g., paths starting with `../` or absolute paths) that would extract outside of the expected `.claude` directory. 3. **Safer extraction**: Extract to a temporary, isolated directory first (`mktemp -d`), then carefully move only the expected `.claude` directory and its contents to `$HOME`. This prevents any malicious files from being written directly to `$HOME` or other sensitive locations. | LLM | SKILL.md:228 |
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