Trust Assessment
bambu-print received a trust score of 43/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 4 findings: 1 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Suspicious import: requests, Dangerous call: subprocess.run().
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings4
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/voice-devotional/bambu-print/scripts/slice_model.py:77 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'slice_model'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/snail3d/voice-devotional/bambu-print/scripts/slice_model.py:77 | |
| MEDIUM | Suspicious import: requests Import of 'requests' detected. This module provides network or low-level system access. Verify this import is necessary. Network and system modules in skill code may indicate data exfiltration. | Static | skills/snail3d/voice-devotional/bambu-print/scripts/search_models.py:8 | |
| MEDIUM | Potential data exfiltration via arbitrary file loading in BambuStudio CLI The `slice_model.py` script allows users to specify arbitrary file paths for `printer_profile`, `process_profile`, and `filament_profile` via command-line arguments. These paths are passed directly to the `bambu-studio` CLI using `--load-settings` and `--load-filaments`. The script captures and prints the standard output and standard error of the `bambu-studio` process. If a malicious user provides a path to a sensitive file (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) that is not a valid JSON configuration, `bambu-studio` will attempt to load and parse its content. If `bambu-studio`'s error messages or logs include parts of the file's content when parsing fails, this sensitive content could be captured by `slice_model.py` and thus exfiltrated. Implement strict validation for profile file paths. Restrict profile paths to a specific, non-sensitive directory (e.g., `~/.bambu-config/printers/`). Alternatively, if possible, sanitize or validate the content of the profile files before passing them to `bambu-studio`, or ensure `bambu-studio` is executed within a sandboxed environment that prevents access to sensitive files. | LLM | scripts/slice_model.py:54 |
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