Trust Assessment
clawcast received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 11 findings: 4 critical, 0 high, 6 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Persistence / self-modification instructions, Arbitrary command execution, Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Manifest Analysis layer scored lowest at 40/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings11
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Persistence / self-modification instructions Shell RC file modification for persistence Remove any persistence mechanisms. Skills should not modify system startup configurations, crontabs, LaunchAgents, systemd services, or shell profiles. | Manifest | skills/tezatezaz/evm-wallet-clawcast/scripts/01_install_cast.sh:22 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Remote code download piped to interpreter Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/tezatezaz/evm-wallet-clawcast/scripts/01_install_cast.sh:19 | |
| CRITICAL | Remote code execution: curl/wget pipe to shell Detected a pattern that downloads and immediately executes remote code. This is a primary malware delivery vector. Never pipe curl/wget output directly to a shell interpreter. | Static | skills/tezatezaz/evm-wallet-clawcast/scripts/01_install_cast.sh:15 | |
| CRITICAL | Unverified script execution from remote URL The script `01_install_cast.sh` downloads and executes a shell script directly from `https://foundry.paradigm.xyz` using `curl -L ... | bash`. This practice is highly dangerous as it allows arbitrary code execution on the system if the remote server is compromised or serves malicious content. There is no integrity check (e.g., checksum verification) or version pinning, making it a significant supply chain risk. Avoid piping `curl` output directly to `bash`. Instead, download the script, inspect it, verify its integrity (e.g., with a GPG signature or checksum), and then execute it. Ideally, use a package manager or pre-built binaries for installation. | LLM | scripts/01_install_cast.sh:17 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME Access to sensitive environment variable '$HOME' detected in shell context. Verify this environment variable access is necessary and the value is not exfiltrated. | Static | skills/tezatezaz/evm-wallet-clawcast/scripts/00_lib.sh:5 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME Access to sensitive environment variable '$HOME' detected in shell context. Verify this environment variable access is necessary and the value is not exfiltrated. | Static | skills/tezatezaz/evm-wallet-clawcast/scripts/01_install_cast.sh:22 | |
| MEDIUM | Persistence mechanism: Shell RC file modification Detected Shell RC file modification pattern. Persistence mechanisms allow malware to survive system restarts. Review this persistence pattern. Skills should not modify system startup configuration. | Static | skills/tezatezaz/evm-wallet-clawcast/scripts/01_install_cast.sh:22 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME Access to sensitive environment variable '$HOME' detected in shell context. Verify this environment variable access is necessary and the value is not exfiltrated. | Static | skills/tezatezaz/evm-wallet-clawcast/scripts/remove_wallet.sh:17 | |
| MEDIUM | Undefined critical function `derive_pk_from_mnemonic` The script `02_wallet.sh` calls `derive_pk_from_mnemonic "$MNEMONIC"` on line 108, but this function is not defined anywhere in the provided scripts (`00_lib.sh` or `02_wallet.sh`). This will cause the script to fail if the user chooses option 2 (Import mnemonic), preventing a core functionality of the skill. While the script includes error handling to exit safely, the missing implementation makes this feature unusable. Implement the `derive_pk_from_mnemonic` function, likely using `cast wallet derive` or a similar `cast` command, ensuring proper quoting and error handling for the mnemonic input. | LLM | scripts/02_wallet.sh:108 | |
| MEDIUM | Undefined critical function `add_custom_token_to_json` The script `05_tokens.sh` calls `add_custom_token_to_json "${TOKENS_JSON}" "${NET_KEY}" "${sym}" "${addr}" "${dec}"` on line 70, but this function is not defined anywhere in the provided scripts (`00_lib.sh` or `05_tokens.sh`). This will cause the script to fail if the user attempts to add custom tokens, preventing a core functionality of the skill. If this function were to be implemented, it would involve modifying a JSON file, which could introduce command injection or data corruption risks if not handled carefully (e.g., if user inputs are not properly escaped). Implement the `add_custom_token_to_json` function, preferably using a robust JSON parsing and modification tool (like `jq` or a Python script) to safely insert user-provided token details into `TOKENS_JSON`, ensuring proper escaping and validation of inputs. | LLM | scripts/05_tokens.sh:70 | |
| LOW | Temporary storage of sensitive credentials on disk The skill temporarily stores the user's mnemonic (`mnemonic-words-*.txt`), private key (`privatekey.tmp`), and password (`pw.txt`) on disk during the onboarding process. While these files are created with strict permissions (`chmod 600`) and are intended for temporary use with cleanup mechanisms (e.g., `rm -f` for private key/password, `at` job for mnemonic), their presence on disk, even for a short period, increases the attack surface. A sophisticated attacker with local access during this window could potentially exfiltrate these credentials. Explore alternative methods for passing sensitive information to `cast` commands that avoid writing to disk, such as using process substitution (`<()`) or named pipes, if `cast` supports reading from them. If temporary files are unavoidable, ensure they are deleted immediately after use and that the system's temporary directory handling is secure. | LLM | scripts/02_wallet.sh:130 |
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