Trust Assessment
clawdbot-sync received a trust score of 72/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 1 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Remote Command Injection via unsanitized rsync remote_path.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Remote Command Injection via unsanitized rsync remote_path The `remote_path` variable, which is initially provided as the fourth argument to the `add` command (`${4}`) and subsequently stored in `peers.json`, is user-controlled. This untrusted input is later retrieved and directly interpolated into the remote target specification for `rsync` operations (e.g., `"${user}@${host}:${remote_path}/$path"`). If `remote_path` contains shell metacharacters (such as backticks `` ` `` for command substitution, dollar-parentheses `$(...)`, newlines `\n`, or unescaped semicolons `;`), these could be interpreted by the remote shell when `rsync` is invoked via `ssh`. This could lead to arbitrary command execution on the remote peer, allowing an attacker to execute commands on the synchronized machine. Implement strict input validation for the `remote_path` argument in the `add` command (line 109) to ensure it contains only safe characters (e.g., alphanumeric, '/', '.', '-', '_') and no shell metacharacters. This validation should occur before storing the path in `peers.json`. Additionally, consider using `rsync`'s `--protect-args` (`-s`) option, which can help prevent the remote shell from interpreting special characters in filenames, although input validation remains the primary defense. | LLM | scripts/handler.sh:200 |
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