Trust Assessment
clawver-print-on-demand received a trust score of 92/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via design upload URL, Potential Data Exfiltration via arbitrary webhook URL.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via design upload URL The skill's API allows uploading design files by providing a `fileUrl` parameter. If the skill's tool for this API endpoint (`POST /v1/products/{productId}/pod-designs`) does not properly validate or sanitize user-provided URLs, an attacker could craft a malicious URL. This could cause the agent to make requests to internal network resources, probe local services, or exfiltrate data to an attacker-controlled server. Implement strict input validation for the `fileUrl` parameter in the skill's tool. Restrict allowed URL schemes (e.g., only `https`), hosts, and/or use an allowlist of trusted domains. Ensure the tool does not follow redirects to internal resources. | LLM | SKILL.md:108 | |
| MEDIUM | Potential Data Exfiltration via arbitrary webhook URL The skill's API allows creating webhooks with an arbitrary `url` parameter. If the skill's tool for this API endpoint (`POST /v1/webhooks`) does not properly validate or sanitize user-provided URLs, an attacker could register a webhook pointing to an attacker-controlled server. This could lead to sensitive event data (e.g., order status, tracking info) being sent to the attacker's server, resulting in data exfiltration. Implement strict input validation for the `url` parameter in the skill's tool. Restrict allowed URL schemes (e.g., only `https`), hosts, and/or use an allowlist of trusted domains. Consider requiring explicit user confirmation for external webhook URLs. | LLM | SKILL.md:204 |
Scan History
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