Trust Assessment
content-repurposing received a trust score of 86/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Overly broad Bash permission for 'infsh' CLI.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Overly broad Bash permission for 'infsh' CLI The skill declares `Bash(infsh *)` in its manifest as an allowed tool. This grants the AI agent permission to execute *any* command starting with `infsh` with *any* arguments. The `infsh` CLI is a platform for running various applications, which can have diverse and potentially powerful capabilities (e.g., interacting with social media, generating content, or potentially accessing external services). This broad permission creates a significant attack surface. If the skill were to construct `infsh` commands using untrusted user input, it could lead to various exploits, including:
- **Command Injection:** If `infsh` or an `infsh` app allows arbitrary command execution via its arguments.
- **Data Exfiltration:** If an `infsh` app can access or transmit sensitive data (e.g., local files, environment variables, or API responses).
- **Malicious Actions:** Performing undesirable actions via `infsh` apps (e.g., posting spam to social media via `x/post-create` as shown in the examples, or interacting with other external services).
The `*` wildcard makes this permission highly permissive and dangerous, as it does not restrict the specific `infsh` subcommands or applications that can be run. Restrict the `Bash` permission to specific `infsh` subcommands and arguments (e.g., `Bash(infsh app run falai/flux-dev-lora)`, `Bash(infsh app run x/post-create)`) or specific `infsh` apps, rather than allowing `*`. Implement strict input validation and sanitization if user input is used to construct `infsh` commands to prevent malicious arguments from being passed to `infsh`. | LLM | SKILL.md:1 |
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