Trust Assessment
design-integration received a trust score of 94/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Excessive permissions declared in manifest.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Excessive permissions declared in manifest The skill's manifest declares permissions for `Read`, `Write`, `Edit`, `Glob`, `Grep`, and `mcp__uniswap__get_supported_chains`. However, the skill's `Workflow` and `Important Notes` sections explicitly state that it 'delegates entirely to the `integration-architect` agent' and 'does not call MCP tools directly.' The skill's described function is to extract parameters and delegate to a subagent, which does not require direct filesystem access or the `mcp__uniswap__get_supported_chains` tool. These permissions are excessive for the skill's stated purpose. Remove `Read`, `Write`, `Edit`, `Glob`, `Grep`, and `mcp__uniswap__get_supported_chains` from the `allowed-tools` list in the manifest. Only `Task(subagent_type:integration-architect)` appears to be necessary for this skill. If the `integration-architect` subagent requires these tools, its own manifest should declare them. | LLM | SKILL.md:1 |
Scan History
Embed Code
[](https://skillshield.io/report/729d36fc0567f162)
Powered by SkillShield