Trust Assessment
github-pat received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 36 findings: 16 critical, 19 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unsafe environment variable passthrough, Arbitrary command execution, Credential harvesting.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Manifest Analysis layer scored lowest at 0/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings36
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:76 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:89 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:95 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:101 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:114 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:118 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:134 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:138 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:146 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:151 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:161 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:166 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:184 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:200 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:226 | |
| CRITICAL | Credential harvesting Reading well-known credential environment variables Skills should only access environment variables they explicitly need. Bulk environment dumps (os.environ.copy, JSON.stringify(process.env)) are almost always malicious. Remove access to Keychain, GPG keys, and credential stores. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:13 | |
| HIGH | Unsafe environment variable passthrough Access to well-known credential environment variables Minimize environment variable exposure. Only pass required, non-sensitive variables to MCP servers. Use dedicated secret management instead of environment passthrough. | Manifest | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:13 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_clone'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:76 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_branch'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:89 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_branch'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:95 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_push'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:114 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_push'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:118 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_push'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:134 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_push'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:138 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_pr'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:184 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_pr'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:200 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_branch'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:101 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_push'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:146 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_push'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:151 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_issue'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:226 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_push'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:161 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'cmd_push'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:166 | |
| HIGH | Command Injection via Argument Injection in git clone The `cmd_clone` function constructs a `git clone` command where the `repo` argument, which is user-controlled, is directly embedded into the URL. A malicious user could inject `git` options by crafting the `repo` string (e.g., `owner/repo --upload-pack=evil_script`). This could lead to arbitrary command execution or manipulation of the git client's behavior. Strictly validate the `repo` argument to ensure it only contains valid GitHub repository paths (e.g., `owner/repo` format) and does not contain any characters that could be interpreted as `git` command-line options. Alternatively, consider using a `git` library that handles argument sanitization internally. | LLM | scripts/gh.py:78 | |
| HIGH | Command Injection via Argument Injection in git checkout The `cmd_branch` function constructs `git checkout` commands where the `branch` argument, which is user-controlled, is directly passed to `subprocess.run`. A malicious user could inject `git` options by crafting the `branch` string (e.g., `--orphan evil_branch`). This could lead to unexpected repository state changes or other `git` command manipulations. When passing user-controlled arguments to `git checkout`, use the `--` separator to indicate the end of options. For example, `subprocess.run(["git", "checkout", "-b", "--", branch])`. Also, validate the `branch` name to conform to valid git branch naming conventions. | LLM | scripts/gh.py:104 | |
| HIGH | Command Injection via Argument Injection in git push The `cmd_push` function constructs `git push` commands where the `branch` argument, which is user-controlled, is directly passed to `subprocess.run`. A malicious user could inject `git` options by crafting the `branch` string (e.g., `main --force`). This could lead to unintended actions like force-pushing and overwriting repository history. When passing user-controlled arguments to `git push`, use the `--` separator to indicate the end of options. For example, `subprocess.run(["git", "push", "-u", "origin", "--", branch])`. Also, validate the `branch` name to conform to valid git branch naming conventions. | LLM | scripts/gh.py:156 | |
| MEDIUM | Suspicious import: urllib.request Import of 'urllib.request' detected. This module provides network or low-level system access. Verify this import is necessary. Network and system modules in skill code may indicate data exfiltration. | Static | skills/dannyshmueli/github-token/scripts/gh.py:9 |
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