Trust Assessment
heimdall received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 13 findings: 5 critical, 4 high, 3 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Missing required field: name, Dangerous call: subprocess.run().
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Manifest Analysis layer scored lowest at 0/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings13
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/henrino3/heimdall/scripts/skill-scan.py:474 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/henrino3/heimdall/skill-scan.py:474 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Remote code download piped to interpreter Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/henrino3/heimdall/scripts/skill-scan.py:17 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Remote code download piped to interpreter Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/henrino3/heimdall/skill-scan.py:17 | |
| CRITICAL | Skill requires broad 'exec' permission The skill's manifest (`skill.json`) explicitly requests the `exec` tool permission. This grants the skill the ability to execute arbitrary shell commands, which is a highly privileged and dangerous capability. While this skill is a security scanner and may require such permissions for its legitimate function (e.g., running `git`, `grep`, `rm` on target skills), it significantly increases the attack surface. If the skill itself has vulnerabilities (e.g., command injection in its `subprocess` calls), this permission could be exploited to execute malicious commands on the host system. Review the necessity of the `exec` permission. If absolutely required, ensure all calls to external commands are meticulously sanitized and validated, especially when incorporating user-controlled input. Consider if more granular permissions or a sandboxed execution environment could achieve the same functionality with less risk. | LLM | skill.json:20 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'generate_ai_analysis'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/henrino3/heimdall/scripts/skill-scan.py:474 | |
| HIGH | Potential data exfiltration: file read + network send Function 'generate_ai_analysis' reads files and sends data over the network. This may indicate data exfiltration. Review this function to ensure file contents are not being sent to external servers. | Static | skills/henrino3/heimdall/scripts/skill-scan.py:495 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'generate_ai_analysis'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/henrino3/heimdall/skill-scan.py:474 | |
| HIGH | Potential data exfiltration: file read + network send Function 'generate_ai_analysis' reads files and sends data over the network. This may indicate data exfiltration. Review this function to ensure file contents are not being sent to external servers. | Static | skills/henrino3/heimdall/skill-scan.py:495 | |
| MEDIUM | Missing required field: name The 'name' field is required for openclaw skills but is missing from frontmatter. Add a 'name' field to the SKILL.md frontmatter. | Static | skills/henrino3/heimdall/SKILL.md:1 | |
| MEDIUM | Suspicious import: urllib.request Import of 'urllib.request' detected. This module provides network or low-level system access. Verify this import is necessary. Network and system modules in skill code may indicate data exfiltration. | Static | skills/henrino3/heimdall/scripts/skill-scan.py:501 | |
| MEDIUM | Suspicious import: urllib.request Import of 'urllib.request' detected. This module provides network or low-level system access. Verify this import is necessary. Network and system modules in skill code may indicate data exfiltration. | Static | skills/henrino3/heimdall/skill-scan.py:501 | |
| INFO | Skill requires and uses OpenRouter API key for AI analysis The skill's manifest (`skill.json`) and documentation (`SKILL.md`) indicate that it requires an `OPENROUTER_API_KEY` environment variable for its AI-powered analysis feature. This means the skill will send the content of other skills being analyzed to the OpenRouter API. While this is a documented and intended feature, users should be aware that their data (the skill content) will be transmitted to a third-party service. Ensure users are fully aware of the data transmission to OpenRouter and its implications for privacy and data security. Provide clear instructions on how to configure or disable this feature if desired. | LLM | skill.json:21 |
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