Trust Assessment
homebridge received a trust score of 45/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 5 findings: 0 critical, 3 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Suspicious import: urllib.request, Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME, Sensitive path access: AI agent config.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings5
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Sensitive path access: AI agent config Access to AI agent config path detected: '~/.clawdbot/'. This may indicate credential theft. Verify that access to this sensitive path is justified and declared. | Static | skills/jiasenl/clawdbot-skill-homebridge/SKILL.md:9 | |
| HIGH | Insecure Credential Storage and Potential Exfiltration/SSRF The skill requires Homebridge API credentials (username and password) to be stored in plain text within `~/.clawdbot/credentials/homebridge.json`. This practice exposes sensitive information if the file system is compromised. Furthermore, the script loads the Homebridge API URL from this same file. If an attacker gains write access to `homebridge.json`, they could modify the `url` field to point to an arbitrary malicious server. This would cause the skill to send authentication credentials and subsequent API requests to the attacker-controlled endpoint, leading to data exfiltration and potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against internal networks. Implement robust access controls and strict file permissions (e.g., `chmod 600`) on `~/.clawdbot/credentials/homebridge.json`. Consider using a secure credential store (e.g., environment variables, OS keyring, or a secrets management service) instead of plain-text files. Additionally, validate the `url` from the config file against a whitelist of allowed domains or IP ranges, and ensure all communication uses HTTPS. | LLM | scripts/homebridge_api.py:27 | |
| HIGH | Potential Insecure Transmission of Credentials over HTTP The `make_request` function does not enforce HTTPS for API communication. If the `url` specified in `~/.clawdbot/credentials/homebridge.json` uses an `http://` scheme instead of `https://`, authentication credentials (username, password, and access token) will be transmitted in plain text over the network, making them vulnerable to interception. Modify the `make_request` function to explicitly check that the `url` uses an `https://` scheme. If an `http://` URL is provided, either raise an error or automatically upgrade to `https://`. Additionally, advise users in the documentation to always use HTTPS for their Homebridge URL. | LLM | scripts/homebridge_api.py:40 | |
| MEDIUM | Suspicious import: urllib.request Import of 'urllib.request' detected. This module provides network or low-level system access. Verify this import is necessary. Network and system modules in skill code may indicate data exfiltration. | Static | skills/jiasenl/clawdbot-skill-homebridge/scripts/homebridge_api.py:22 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME Access to sensitive environment variable '$HOME' detected in shell context. Verify this environment variable access is necessary and the value is not exfiltrated. | Static | skills/jiasenl/clawdbot-skill-homebridge/SKILL.md:28 |
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