Trust Assessment
meshtastic received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 14 findings: 9 critical, 3 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval, Node lockfile missing.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Manifest Analysis layer scored lowest at 0/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings14
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python dynamic code execution (exec/eval/compile) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-direct.js:23 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python dynamic code execution (exec/eval/compile) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-persistent.js:142 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Node.js child_process require Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-direct.js:7 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Node.js child_process require Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-persistent.js:16 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Node.js synchronous shell execution Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-direct.js:27 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Node.js synchronous shell execution Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-persistent.js:55 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Node.js synchronous shell execution Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-persistent.js:170 | |
| CRITICAL | Command Injection in meshtastic-direct.js via execSync The `meshtastic-direct.js` script uses `child_process.execSync` to execute `meshtastic` CLI commands. User-controlled input is directly concatenated into the shell command string without sufficient sanitization, leading to command injection vulnerabilities. Specifically:
- In `setSetting(path, value)`, the `value` parameter (derived from user input via `input.match(/set\s+(\S+)\s+(?:to\s+)?(.+)$/i)`) is directly appended to the command. An input like `set lora.region to US; rm -rf /` would execute `rm -rf /`.
- In `sendMessage(destination, text)`, the `destination` parameter is directly appended. The `text` parameter is quoted but only escapes double quotes, leaving other shell metacharacters (e.g., `$(...)`, backticks) vulnerable. An input like `msg @!abc123 --set lora.region US; echo PWNED > /tmp/pwned.txt` or `send a message to bob: hello"; rm -rf /; echo "there` could lead to arbitrary command execution. Refactor command execution to use `child_process.spawn` with an array of arguments, where each user-controlled input is passed as a separate array element. This prevents shell interpretation of arguments. If `execSync` must be used, implement robust shell escaping for all user-controlled input using a dedicated library (e.g., `shell-quote` or `shlex`) to prevent injection of shell metacharacters. | LLM | scripts/meshtastic-direct.js:139 | |
| CRITICAL | Command Injection in meshtastic-persistent.js via execSync The `meshtastic-persistent.js` script's `_executeCommand` function (called by `exec`) constructs shell commands using `child_process.execSync` by concatenating `meshtastic --port ${this.port}` with a user-controlled `args` string. Many functions (e.g., `sendMessage`, `setSetting`, `setChannel`, `setPosition`, `setMQTT`) pass user-controlled input directly or with insufficient escaping into this `args` parameter. For example:
- `sendMessage(text)`: `text` is only escaped for double quotes, leaving `$(...)` or backticks vulnerable.
- `setSetting(path, value)`: `value` is directly appended.
- `setPosition(latitude, longitude, altitude)`: `latitude`, `longitude`, `altitude` are directly appended.
- `setMQTT(server, port, username, password)`: `port` is directly appended, and `server`, `username`, `password` are quoted but not fully shell-escaped. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary shell commands. Refactor command execution to use `child_process.spawn` with an array of arguments, where each user-controlled input is passed as a separate array element. This prevents shell interpretation of arguments. If `execSync` must be used, implement robust shell escaping for all user-controlled input using a dedicated library (e.g., `shell-quote` or `shlex`) to prevent injection of shell metacharacters. | LLM | scripts/meshtastic-persistent.js:161 | |
| HIGH | Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-direct.js:35 | |
| HIGH | Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-direct.js:40 | |
| HIGH | Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-persistent.js:252 | |
| MEDIUM | Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions. | Manifest | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/scripts/meshtastic-direct.js:169 | |
| LOW | Node lockfile missing package.json is present but no lockfile was found (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, or yarn.lock). Commit a lockfile for deterministic dependency resolution. | Dependencies | skills/snail3d/clawd/meshtastic-skill/package.json |
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