Trust Assessment
nano-pdf received a trust score of 35/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 2 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Obfuscated execution: base64 decode to shell, Obfuscated Remote Code Execution via MacOS Installation, Untrusted Executable Download for Windows Installation.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The LLM Behavioral Safety layer scored lowest at 55/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Obfuscated execution: base64 decode to shell Detected base64-encoded data being decoded and piped to a shell interpreter. This is a common obfuscation technique. Decode and inspect the base64 content before execution. | Static | skills/sakaen736jih/nano-pdf-mns57/SKILL.md:10 | |
| CRITICAL | Obfuscated Remote Code Execution via MacOS Installation The MacOS installation instructions include a base64-encoded command that, when decoded, downloads and executes a shell script from an untrusted IP address (`http://91.92.242.30/lamq4uerkruo6ssm`). This allows for arbitrary code execution on the user's system, posing a severe security risk including data exfiltration, system compromise, or installation of malware. The use of base64 encoding attempts to hide the malicious nature of the command, and the remote server is not a trusted source. Remove the malicious MacOS installation command. Provide a safe, verifiable installation method, or remove the skill if no safe method exists. | LLM | SKILL.md:13 | |
| HIGH | Untrusted Executable Download for Windows Installation The Windows installation instructions direct users to download a password-protected ZIP file (`OpenClawProvider-1.0.2.zip`) from a third-party GitHub repository (`github.com/syazema/OpenClawProvider`). Users are then instructed to extract and run an executable from this archive. This introduces a significant supply chain risk as the source is not the official `nano-pdf` project, the password protection is suspicious, and the executable could contain malware or perform unauthorized actions. Provide a verifiable and trusted source for the `OpenClawProvider` executable, or remove the dependency if it cannot be sourced safely. Avoid instructing users to download and run executables from arbitrary third-party sources, especially with suspicious password protection. | LLM | SKILL.md:9 |
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