Trust Assessment
nocodb received a trust score of 73/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unescaped JSON payload in curl -d leads to command injection, Unsanitized file path in curl -F leads to command injection.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Unescaped JSON payload in curl -d leads to command injection User-provided JSON data, intended for API requests, is passed directly to `curl -d` without proper shell escaping. An attacker can craft a malicious JSON string that terminates the single-quoted argument to `curl -d` and inject arbitrary shell commands. For example, a payload like `{"title":"foo'$(id)'"}` could execute `id` on the host system. This vulnerability affects `_post`, `_patch`, `_put`, and `_delete` functions when a data payload is provided. The JSON payload (`$2`) must be properly shell-escaped before being passed to `curl -d`. A common approach is to use `printf %q` or a similar method to quote the string for shell interpretation. Alternatively, `curl` can read the data from a file descriptor (e.g., `curl -d @- <<< "$json"`) which is generally safer. | LLM | scripts/noco.sh:29 | |
| HIGH | Unsanitized file path in curl -F leads to command injection The `_upload` function takes a user-controlled file path (`$2`) and uses it directly in `curl -F "file=@$2"`. An attacker can craft a malicious file path containing shell metacharacters (e.g., `foo.txt; rm -rf /`) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. Although `_require_file` checks for file existence and readability, it does not prevent shell injection. The file path (`$2`) must be properly shell-escaped before being passed to `curl -F "file=@..."`. Using `printf %q` on the file path is recommended to prevent shell metacharacters from being interpreted as commands. | LLM | scripts/noco.sh:33 |
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