Trust Assessment
openclaw-backup received a trust score of 58/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 5 findings: 3 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME, Command Injection in mkdir via unsanitized user input, Command Injection in tar command via unsanitized user input.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The LLM Behavioral Safety layer scored lowest at 0/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 9c1b8e80). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings5
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Command Injection in tar command via unsanitized user input The `tar -czf "$BACKUP_FILE"` command constructs the output filename using user-controlled input (`$BACKUP_DIR`). If `$BACKUP_DIR` contains shell metacharacters (e.g., `$(command)` or backticks), these will be executed by the shell before `tar` is invoked, leading to arbitrary command execution. For example, `BACKUP_DIR="$(rm -rf /)"` would execute `rm -rf /`. Sanitize or validate the `$BACKUP_DIR` variable to ensure it does not contain shell metacharacters. A robust solution involves validating the path against a safe pattern (e.g., alphanumeric, slashes, dots, no leading hyphens, no `..`), or using `realpath` to canonicalize and then checking if it's within an allowed directory. | LLM | scripts/backup.sh:10 | |
| CRITICAL | Command Injection in ls command (rotation) via unsanitized user input The `ls -t "$BACKUP_DIR"/openclaw-*.tar.gz` command uses user-controlled input (`$BACKUP_DIR`) directly. If `$BACKUP_DIR` contains shell metacharacters (e.g., `$(command)` or backticks), these will be executed by the shell before `ls` is invoked, leading to arbitrary command execution. For example, `BACKUP_DIR="$(rm -rf /)"` would execute `rm -rf /`. Sanitize or validate the `$BACKUP_DIR` variable to ensure it does not contain shell metacharacters. A robust solution involves validating the path against a safe pattern (e.g., alphanumeric, slashes, dots, no leading hyphens, no `..`), or using `realpath` to canonicalize and then checking if it's within an allowed directory. | LLM | scripts/backup.sh:16 | |
| CRITICAL | Command Injection in ls command (count) via unsanitized user input The `ls "$BACKUP_DIR"/openclaw-*.tar.gz` command uses user-controlled input (`$BACKUP_DIR`) directly. If `$BACKUP_DIR` contains shell metacharacters (e.g., `$(command)` or backticks), these will be executed by the shell before `ls` is invoked, leading to arbitrary command execution. For example, `BACKUP_DIR="$(rm -rf /)"` would execute `rm -rf /`. Sanitize or validate the `$BACKUP_DIR` variable to ensure it does not contain shell metacharacters. A robust solution involves validating the path against a safe pattern (e.g., alphanumeric, slashes, dots, no leading hyphens, no `..`), or using `realpath` to canonicalize and then checking if it's within an allowed directory. | LLM | scripts/backup.sh:19 | |
| HIGH | Command Injection in mkdir via unsanitized user input The `mkdir -p "$BACKUP_DIR"` command uses user-controlled input (`$BACKUP_DIR`) directly. If `$BACKUP_DIR` starts with a hyphen (e.g., `-m 777`), `mkdir` might interpret it as an option, potentially leading to unexpected directory creation or option interpretation. While less severe than direct shell execution, it's a vulnerability that can be exploited. Use `mkdir -p -- "$BACKUP_DIR"` to prevent `mkdir` from interpreting user input as options. Additionally, validate `$BACKUP_DIR` to ensure it's a safe path (e.g., no leading hyphens, no shell metacharacters). | LLM | scripts/backup.sh:7 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME Access to sensitive environment variable '$HOME' detected in shell context. Verify this environment variable access is necessary and the value is not exfiltrated. | Static | skills/alex3alex/openclaw-backup/scripts/backup.sh:5 |
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