Trust Assessment
parking-finder received a trust score of 41/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 1 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include File read + network send exfiltration, Sensitive path access: AI agent config, Shell command injection via unquoted input to `echo`.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | File read + network send exfiltration AI agent config/credential file access Remove access to sensitive files not required by the skill's stated purpose. SSH keys, cloud credentials, and browser data should never be read by skills unless explicitly part of their declared functionality. | Manifest | skills/barneyjm/parking-finder/SKILL.md:41 | |
| HIGH | Sensitive path access: AI agent config Access to AI agent config path detected: '~/.claude/'. This may indicate credential theft. Verify that access to this sensitive path is justified and declared. | Static | skills/barneyjm/parking-finder/SKILL.md:41 | |
| HIGH | Shell command injection via unquoted input to `echo` The `parking-finder.sh` script uses `echo "$INPUT"` to pass the user-provided JSON input to `jq` multiple times. If the `$INPUT` variable contains shell metacharacters or command substitutions (e.g., `$(command)`), these will be expanded and executed by the shell before being passed to `jq`. This allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands by crafting a malicious JSON input string. Replace `echo "$INPUT" | jq ...` with `jq ... <<< "$INPUT"` or `jq ... <<EOF\n$INPUT\nEOF` to pass the variable content directly to `jq`'s stdin without shell expansion. This prevents the shell from interpreting the contents of `$INPUT` as commands. Apply this fix to all instances where `$INPUT` is piped to `jq` via `echo`. | LLM | scripts/parking-finder.sh:20 |
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