Trust Assessment
postiz received a trust score of 90/100, placing it in the Trusted category. This skill has passed all critical security checks and demonstrates strong security practices.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Skill documents API endpoint for arbitrary local file upload, Skill documents API endpoint for fetching content from arbitrary URLs.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Skill documents API endpoint for arbitrary local file upload The skill documentation (`SKILL.md`) includes an example `curl` command demonstrating how to upload a local file using the Postiz API (`-F "file=@/path/to/your/file.png"`). If an AI agent implements this functionality, it would require read access to the local filesystem. A malicious prompt could then instruct the agent to upload sensitive files (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, API keys, configuration files) from the agent's environment, leading to data exfiltration. If local file upload is not strictly necessary, consider removing or restricting this capability. If required, ensure the agent's implementation has strict access controls on file paths and types, and that user input for file paths is heavily sanitized and validated. | LLM | SKILL.md:36 | |
| MEDIUM | Skill documents API endpoint for fetching content from arbitrary URLs The skill documentation (`SKILL.md`) includes an example `curl` command demonstrating how to upload a file to Postiz by providing an arbitrary URL (`"url": "https://example.com/image.png"`). If an AI agent implements this functionality, a malicious prompt could instruct the agent to provide internal network URLs (e.g., `http://localhost/admin`, `file:///etc/passwd` if supported by the Postiz API), potentially leading to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against the Postiz service or data exfiltration if the Postiz service fetches and processes sensitive content from internal resources. If fetching from arbitrary URLs is not strictly necessary, consider removing or restricting this capability. If required, ensure the agent's implementation validates and sanitizes URLs provided by users. The Postiz API itself should implement robust SSRF protections. | LLM | SKILL.md:45 |
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