Security Audit

ppt-ooxml-translator

github.com/openclaw/skills

AI SkillCommit 13146e6a3d46

TRUSTED

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

ppt-ooxml-translator received a trust score of 79/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval, Zip Slip vulnerability during PPTX unpacking.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

93%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

2 findings

Dynamic Code

2 findings

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Zip Slip vulnerability during PPTX unpacking The `unpack` function uses `zipfile.ZipFile.extractall()` without validating the filenames within the archive. A malicious `.pptx` file (which is a zip archive) could contain entries with path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../../../etc/passwd` or `../../../../tmp/malicious_script.sh`). This could lead to arbitrary file creation or overwrite outside the intended `output_root` directory, potentially enabling command injection (by writing executable files to known paths) or data exfiltration (by overwriting sensitive configuration files). Before calling `zf.extractall()`, iterate through `zf.infolist()` and for each `ZipInfo` object, check `zipinfo.filename` for path traversal sequences (e.g., `..`, absolute paths). Ensure that the resolved path for each file to be extracted remains strictly within the `output_root` directory. A safer approach is to manually extract each file after validating its path.	LLM	src/ppt_ooxml_tool/cli.py:144
MEDIUM	Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions.	Manifest	skills/jason2be/ppt-ooxml-tool/src/ppt_ooxml_tool/cli.py:477

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