Trust Assessment
printer received a trust score of 74/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via Unsanitized Arguments, Use of Sudo Commands Implies Elevated Privileges.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Potential Command Injection via Unsanitized Arguments The skill demonstrates shell commands like `lp filename.pdf` and `lp -d MyPrinter filename.pdf`. If an AI agent directly interpolates untrusted user input into these command arguments (e.g., `filename.pdf`, `MyPrinter`, `JOB_ID`, `PRINTER_IP`) without proper sanitization or quoting, it could lead to command injection. An attacker could craft malicious input (e.g., `'; rm -rf /'`) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. When constructing shell commands from user input, ensure all arguments are properly sanitized and quoted (e.g., using `shlex.quote` in Python) to prevent arbitrary command execution. Avoid direct interpolation of untrusted input. | LLM | SKILL.md:40 | |
| HIGH | Use of Sudo Commands Implies Elevated Privileges The skill includes examples of commands requiring `sudo` (e.g., `sudo lpadmin -p MyPrinter -o cupsSNMPSupplies=true`). If the AI agent is configured to execute commands with `sudo` privileges, this represents a significant privilege escalation risk. An attacker could potentially leverage other vulnerabilities (like command injection) to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges, leading to full system compromise. The skill's manifest does not explicitly state `sudo` as a requirement, making its presence in the examples a concern if the agent is granted such access. Re-evaluate the necessity of `sudo` for these operations. If elevated privileges are truly required, ensure the agent's execution environment is strictly sandboxed and that `sudo` access is granted only for specific, whitelisted commands with minimal permissions (e.g., via `sudoers` configuration). Avoid granting blanket `sudo` access. | LLM | SKILL.md:32 |
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