Trust Assessment
raini-skill-audit received a trust score of 47/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 5 findings: 1 critical, 0 high, 3 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include File read + network send exfiltration, Missing required field: name, Sensitive path access: Environment file.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings5
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | File read + network send exfiltration .env file access Remove access to sensitive files not required by the skill's stated purpose. SSH keys, cloud credentials, and browser data should never be read by skills unless explicitly part of their declared functionality. | Manifest | skills/0xraini/raini-skill-audit/SKILL.md:35 | |
| MEDIUM | Missing required field: name The 'name' field is required for claude_code skills but is missing from frontmatter. Add a 'name' field to the SKILL.md frontmatter. | Static | skills/0xraini/raini-skill-audit/SKILL.md:1 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive path access: Environment file Access to Environment file path detected: '~/.env'. This may indicate credential theft. Verify that access to this sensitive path is justified and declared. | Static | skills/0xraini/raini-skill-audit/SKILL.md:35 | |
| MEDIUM | Arbitrary directory scanning capability The `scanDirectory` function in `src/audit.js` accepts an arbitrary path as input and recursively reads all files within it. There is no internal validation to restrict the scanning scope to only skill-related directories (e.e.g, `~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/`). This allows the skill to be instructed by the agent to read files from any location on the filesystem, including sensitive system directories or user home directories, which is an excessive permission for a skill whose stated purpose is to audit other skills. While the skill itself does not exfiltrate data, this broad access could be leveraged in a multi-stage attack to locate sensitive information. Implement input validation for the `dir` argument in `scanDirectory` to ensure it only operates within a predefined set of safe directories (e.g., `~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/` or explicitly whitelisted paths). Alternatively, the agent calling the skill should be responsible for providing only safe, sandboxed paths. | LLM | src/audit.js:79 | |
| LOW | Node lockfile missing package.json is present but no lockfile was found (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, or yarn.lock). Commit a lockfile for deterministic dependency resolution. | Dependencies | skills/0xraini/raini-skill-audit/package.json |
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