Trust Assessment
remarkable received a trust score of 13/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 6 findings: 2 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Dangerous call: subprocess.run(), Suspicious import: requests.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The LLM Behavioral Safety layer scored lowest at 48/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings6
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/nickian/remarkable/scripts/article2ebook.py:298 | |
| CRITICAL | Shell Command Injection via unquoted variable expansion The `cmd_send_article` function in `scripts/remarkable.sh` constructs the `EXTRA_ARGS` variable using user-controlled input (`$TITLE`) and then expands this variable unquoted when calling `python3`. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary shell commands by crafting the `--title` argument with shell metacharacters (e.g., `"; evil_command #"`). When the shell processes `python3 ... $EXTRA_ARGS`, the injected commands will be executed. Modify `EXTRA_ARGS` to be an array and expand it safely, or pass arguments directly to `python3` without intermediate string concatenation and unquoted expansion. For example: ```bash local EXTRA_ARGS=() if [ -n "$TITLE" ]; then EXTRA_ARGS+=(--title "$TITLE") fi OUTPUT_FILE=$(python3 "$CONVERTER" "$URL" --format "$FORMAT" "${EXTRA_ARGS[@]}" 2>&1 | tee /dev/stderr | tail -1) ``` | LLM | scripts/remarkable.sh:76 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'to_pdf'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/nickian/remarkable/scripts/article2ebook.py:298 | |
| HIGH | Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) leading to data exfiltration The `cmd_send_article` function in `scripts/remarkable.sh` takes a user-provided URL, which is then passed to `scripts/article2ebook.py`. The Python script fetches content from this URL using `requests.get`. If the skill's execution environment has access to internal network resources, an attacker can provide an internal URL (e.g., `http://localhost:8080/admin/secrets`). The fetched content will be processed into an EPUB/PDF and subsequently uploaded to the reMarkable cloud via `rmapi put`, effectively exfiltrating sensitive internal data. Implement strict URL validation in `scripts/article2ebook.py` to prevent access to internal IP ranges and non-HTTP/HTTPS schemes. Consider whitelisting allowed domains if possible, or proxying requests through a service that enforces such restrictions. | LLM | scripts/article2ebook.py:49 | |
| MEDIUM | Suspicious import: requests Import of 'requests' detected. This module provides network or low-level system access. Verify this import is necessary. Network and system modules in skill code may indicate data exfiltration. | Static | skills/nickian/remarkable/scripts/article2ebook.py:26 | |
| MEDIUM | Unpinned external dependency for `rmapi` installation The `SKILL.md` instructions for installing `rmapi` use `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ddvk/rmapi.git`. This command clones the latest commit from the default branch without specifying a particular version, tag, or commit hash. This introduces a supply chain risk, as a malicious change introduced to the upstream `ddvk/rmapi` repository could be automatically pulled and built into the skill's environment, potentially leading to compromise. Pin the `git clone` operation to a specific, known-good commit hash or tag to ensure reproducibility and prevent unexpected changes from upstream. Example: `git clone --depth 1 --branch <tag_or_commit> https://github.com/ddvk/rmapi.git`. | LLM | SKILL.md:9 |
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