Trust Assessment
salesforce-dx received a trust score of 86/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Command Injection via unsanitized script arguments.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings1
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Command Injection via unsanitized script arguments The `schema-export.sh` script directly interpolates user-provided arguments (`$1` for OBJECT and `$2` for ORG) into shell commands without proper sanitization. Specifically, the `ORG` variable, when used to construct `ORG_FLAG`, can be exploited by an attacker to inject arbitrary shell commands. If an attacker provides input like `my-org --json; rm -rf /; #` for the `ORG` argument, the `rm -rf /` command would be executed when the `sf sobject describe` command is run. Additionally, the `OBJECT` variable is used in constructing the output filename and directly in `sf` commands, making it vulnerable to command substitution (e.g., `$(evil_command)`) if not properly sanitized. Sanitize all user-provided arguments before using them in shell commands. For the `ORG` argument, instead of building a string for `ORG_FLAG`, pass the arguments as separate elements in an array to prevent shell metacharacter interpretation. For example, use `ORG_ARGS=(); if [ -n "$ORG" ]; then ORG_ARGS+=("--target-org" "$ORG"); fi; sf sobject describe ... "${ORG_ARGS[@]}" ...`. Additionally, validate `OBJECT` against expected patterns (e.g., alphanumeric, underscores) to prevent command substitution, path traversal, or other injections. | LLM | scripts/schema-export.sh:18 |
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