Trust Assessment
sap-integration received a trust score of 51/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 6 findings: 2 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval, Missing required field: name, Arbitrary SAP RFC Function Execution.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The LLM Behavioral Safety layer scored lowest at 10/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings6
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary SAP RFC Function Execution The `call_function` method in `SAPRFCCaller` allows executing any RFC-enabled SAP function module with user-supplied function names and parameters. This grants excessive permissions within the SAP system, enabling potential data manipulation, unauthorized access, or system disruption if an attacker can control the inputs to this method. Implement a whitelist of allowed RFC function modules and validate all input parameters against predefined schemas. Restrict the ability to call arbitrary functions. | LLM | scripts/rfc_function_caller.py:85 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary SAP Table Data Extraction The `extract_table_data` method in `SAPDataExtractor` allows specifying any SAP table name, fields, and a `WHERE` clause for data extraction using `RFC_READ_TABLE`. This grants excessive read permissions within the SAP system, enabling potential data exfiltration of sensitive information from any accessible table if an attacker can control the inputs to this method. Implement a whitelist of allowed tables and fields for extraction. Strictly validate and sanitize `where_clause` inputs, or ideally, replace free-form `WHERE` clauses with structured, parameterized query builders. | LLM | scripts/sap_data_extractor.py:47 | |
| HIGH | Arbitrary File Write via `output_file` parameter The `call_function` method allows specifying an `output_file` parameter, which is then used directly as a filename to save the function result. If an attacker can control this `output_file` parameter, they can write arbitrary SAP function results to any location on the filesystem where the script has write permissions, potentially overwriting critical files or exfiltrating data to accessible locations. Sanitize and validate the `output_file` parameter to ensure it only writes to a designated, secure directory. Prevent directory traversal (`../`) and absolute paths. | LLM | scripts/rfc_function_caller.py:100 | |
| HIGH | Arbitrary SAP Table Structure Disclosure The `get_table_structure` method allows retrieving detailed metadata for any SAP table by querying the `DD03L` table. This capability, if exposed to untrusted input, can lead to information disclosure about the internal SAP database schema, which could be used to facilitate further targeted data extraction or manipulation. Restrict the ability to query `DD03L` to only authorized users or specific, whitelisted table names. Ensure `table_name` input is strictly validated. | LLM | scripts/sap_data_extractor.py:110 | |
| MEDIUM | Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions. | Manifest | skills/highlander89/sap-integration/scripts/rfc_function_caller.py:283 | |
| MEDIUM | Missing required field: name The 'name' field is required for claude_code skills but is missing from frontmatter. Add a 'name' field to the SKILL.md frontmatter. | Static | skills/highlander89/sap-integration/SKILL.md:1 |
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