Trust Assessment
skill-defender received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 5 findings: 2 critical, 2 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Unsafe environment variable passthrough, Arbitrary command execution, Credential harvesting.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Manifest Analysis layer scored lowest at 18/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings5
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/itsclawdbro/skill-defender/scripts/aggregate_scan.py:174 | |
| CRITICAL | Credential harvesting Bulk environment variable dump Skills should only access environment variables they explicitly need. Bulk environment dumps (os.environ.copy, JSON.stringify(process.env)) are almost always malicious. Remove access to Keychain, GPG keys, and credential stores. | Manifest | skills/itsclawdbro/skill-defender/scripts/aggregate_scan.py:171 | |
| HIGH | Unsafe environment variable passthrough Bulk environment variable harvesting Minimize environment variable exposure. Only pass required, non-sensitive variables to MCP servers. Use dedicated secret management instead of environment passthrough. | Manifest | skills/itsclawdbro/skill-defender/scripts/aggregate_scan.py:171 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'scan_skill'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/itsclawdbro/skill-defender/scripts/aggregate_scan.py:174 | |
| MEDIUM | Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions. | Manifest | skills/itsclawdbro/skill-defender/scripts/scan_skill.py:11 |
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