Trust Assessment
supalytics received a trust score of 13/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 6 findings: 2 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Remote code execution: curl/wget pipe to shell, Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Static Code Analysis layer scored lowest at 63/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings6
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Remote code download piped to interpreter Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/yogesharc/supalytics/SKILL.md:12 | |
| CRITICAL | Remote code execution: curl/wget pipe to shell Detected a pattern that downloads and immediately executes remote code. This is a primary malware delivery vector. Never pipe curl/wget output directly to a shell interpreter. | Static | skills/yogesharc/supalytics/SKILL.md:12 | |
| HIGH | Potential Command Injection via CLI arguments The skill documentation describes interacting with the `supalytics` CLI tool, which takes numerous arguments (e.g., site names, filter values, periods, event names, property values). If an AI agent constructs these commands by directly interpolating untrusted user input into the `command` string for `exec` (or similar shell execution functions), it creates a command injection vulnerability. An attacker could inject malicious shell commands by crafting specific input for arguments like `--site`, `--filter`, or event/property names. The AI agent's implementation must rigorously sanitize and escape all user-provided input before incorporating it into shell commands executed via `exec` or `subprocess` calls. Consider using a library that safely handles command arguments or explicitly quoting/escaping all dynamic parts of the command string. | LLM | SKILL.md:100 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive environment variable access: $HOME Access to sensitive environment variable '$HOME' detected in shell context. Verify this environment variable access is necessary and the value is not exfiltrated. | Static | skills/yogesharc/supalytics/SKILL.md:13 | |
| MEDIUM | Supply Chain Risk - Unpinned CLI dependency The installation instructions recommend installing the `@supalytics/cli` package globally using `bun add -g @supalytics/cli`. This command does not specify a version, meaning that future installations could pull the latest version, which might introduce breaking changes, vulnerabilities, or even malicious code if the package maintainer's account is compromised. Pin the dependency to a specific, known-good version (e.g., `bun add -g @supalytics/cli@1.2.3`) to ensure deterministic and secure installations. Regularly review and update the pinned version. | LLM | SKILL.md:20 | |
| LOW | Risky installation instructions requiring `sudo` for global symlinks The troubleshooting section suggests using `sudo ln -sf ~/.bun/bin/bun /usr/local/bin/bun` and `sudo ln -sf ~/.bun/bin/supalytics /usr/local/bin/supalytics`. These commands require elevated privileges (`sudo`) and create global symlinks in `/usr/local/bin`. While intended to make the `supalytics` command available to daemon processes, this practice can introduce security risks by modifying system-wide paths with potentially untrusted binaries, and it encourages users to grant excessive permissions during setup. Avoid recommending `sudo` for global symlinks for skill dependencies. Instead, ensure the agent's execution environment has the correct `PATH` configured to include `~/.bun/bin`, or use a local installation strategy that doesn't require system-wide modifications or elevated privileges. If global access is strictly necessary, provide clear warnings about the security implications. | LLM | SKILL.md:179 |
Scan History
Embed Code
[](https://skillshield.io/report/12e116e2d54422d6)
Powered by SkillShield