Security Audit

trello

github.com/openclaw/skills

AI SkillCommit 13146e6a3d46

TRUSTED

Scanned 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

trello received a trust score of 86/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 1 finding: 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via Unsanitized Placeholders in Shell Commands.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

1 finding

Shell Execution

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Security Findings1

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential Command Injection via Unsanitized Placeholders in Shell Commands The skill defines shell commands that use placeholders (e.g., `{boardId}`, `{listId}`, `{cardId}`) and direct string concatenation for data parameters (e.g., `-d 'name=Card Title'`). If an AI agent substitutes untrusted user input directly into these placeholders or data parameters without proper sanitization or escaping, it could lead to command injection. A malicious user could inject arbitrary shell commands or manipulate `curl` arguments, potentially leading to data exfiltration, unauthorized actions, or system compromise. The AI agent responsible for executing this skill must ensure that all user-provided inputs used to fill placeholders (e.g., `{boardId}`, `{listId}`, `{cardId}`) and data parameters (e.g., `name`, `desc`, `text` in `-d` arguments) are thoroughly sanitized and properly escaped for shell execution and URL contexts. Consider using a robust command execution library that handles argument escaping automatically, or explicitly URL-encode path parameters and shell-escape string arguments.	LLM	SKILL.md:20

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