Trust Assessment
tron received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 4 findings: 3 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Remote code execution: curl/wget pipe to shell, Unsanitized user input leads to command injection.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The LLM Behavioral Safety layer scored lowest at 55/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings4
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Remote code download piped to interpreter Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/sakaen736jih/tron/SKILL.md:134 | |
| CRITICAL | Remote code execution: curl/wget pipe to shell Detected a pattern that downloads and immediately executes remote code. This is a primary malware delivery vector. Never pipe curl/wget output directly to a shell interpreter. | Static | skills/sakaen736jih/tron/SKILL.md:134 | |
| CRITICAL | Unsanitized user input leads to command injection User-provided inputs (e.g., `ADDRESS`, `CONTRACT_ADDRESS`, `TX_HASH`) are directly interpolated into shell commands (`python3 -c "..."` and `curl "..."`) without proper sanitization or escaping. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary Python code into the `python3 -c` execution context or arbitrary shell commands into the `curl` execution context, leading to remote code execution on the host system. This vulnerability is present in multiple code blocks throughout the skill. All user-provided inputs must be strictly validated and properly escaped for the context in which they are used. For `python3 -c`, avoid direct string formatting; instead, pass arguments securely (e.g., via environment variables or temporary files, or by using a dedicated Python script that takes arguments). For `curl`, ensure URL components are URL-encoded and shell metacharacters are escaped. The safest approach is to use a dedicated Python script that takes arguments and uses `subprocess.run` with `shell=False` for external commands, or `tronpy`'s API directly for blockchain interactions, avoiding direct shell command construction with user input. | LLM | SKILL.md:13 | |
| HIGH | Unpinned dependency in manifest The `tronpy` package is specified without a version constraint in the `install` section of the manifest. This means that `pip install tronpy` will always fetch the latest available version. If a malicious update to `tronpy` is published, it could be automatically installed, leading to a supply chain compromise. Pin the dependency to a specific, known-good version (e.g., `"package": "tronpy==X.Y.Z"`) to ensure deterministic and secure installations. Regularly review and update pinned versions. | LLM | SKILL.md:4 |
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