Trust Assessment
vector-control received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 6 findings: 1 critical, 4 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Dangerous call: subprocess.run(), Suspicious import: urllib.request.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Static Code Analysis layer scored lowest at 63/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings6
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/dbeadle1/vector-control/scripts/vector_control.py:142 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'main'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/dbeadle1/vector-control/scripts/vector_control.py:142 | |
| HIGH | Potential data exfiltration: file read + network send Function 'upload_audio' reads files and sends data over the network. This may indicate data exfiltration. Review this function to ensure file contents are not being sent to external servers. | Static | skills/dbeadle1/vector-control/scripts/vector_control.py:23 | |
| HIGH | Arbitrary file read via 'play' command The 'play' command in 'scripts/vector_control.py' allows reading arbitrary files from the local filesystem. The 'args.file' parameter, which is user-controlled, is directly used in 'with open(filepath, "rb") as f: file_data = f.read()'. The content of this file is then included in a multipart POST request to the Wirepod API. If the '--base' URL is controlled by an attacker, this allows exfiltration of sensitive local files (e.g., '/etc/passwd', SSH keys). Even if the base URL is local, the skill performs an unauthorized read of an arbitrary file. Implement strict input validation for 'args.file'. Restrict file paths to a specific, non-sensitive directory (e.g., a temporary upload directory) or use a file picker UI instead of a direct path. Ensure the 'base' URL cannot be easily redirected to an external malicious server. | LLM | scripts/vector_control.py:29 | |
| HIGH | Arbitrary file write via 'snapshot' command The 'snapshot' command in 'scripts/vector_control.py' allows writing the camera stream data to an arbitrary file path on the local filesystem. The 'args.out' parameter, which is user-controlled, is directly used in 'with open(args.out, "wb") as f: f.write(data)'. An attacker could specify a path to a critical system file (e.g., '/etc/passwd', '/boot/grub/grub.cfg') or user configuration file, leading to data corruption, denial of service, or potentially further compromise if the overwritten file is executable or configuration-related. Implement strict input validation for 'args.out'. Restrict file paths to a specific, non-sensitive directory (e.g., '/tmp' or a user-specific output directory) and ensure that directory traversal characters ('..', '/') are sanitized or disallowed. | LLM | scripts/vector_control.py:96 | |
| MEDIUM | Suspicious import: urllib.request Import of 'urllib.request' detected. This module provides network or low-level system access. Verify this import is necessary. Network and system modules in skill code may indicate data exfiltration. | Static | skills/dbeadle1/vector-control/scripts/vector_control.py:2 |
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