Trust Assessment
vercel received a trust score of 12/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 5 findings: 2 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include File read + network send exfiltration, Sensitive path access: Environment file, Arbitrary File Write via vercel env pull.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Manifest Analysis layer scored lowest at 40/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings5
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | File read + network send exfiltration .env file access Remove access to sensitive files not required by the skill's stated purpose. SSH keys, cloud credentials, and browser data should never be read by skills unless explicitly part of their declared functionality. | Manifest | skills/thesethrose/vercel/SKILL.md:120 | |
| CRITICAL | File read + network send exfiltration .env file access Remove access to sensitive files not required by the skill's stated purpose. SSH keys, cloud credentials, and browser data should never be read by skills unless explicitly part of their declared functionality. | Manifest | skills/thesethrose/vercel/SKILL.md:129 | |
| HIGH | Arbitrary File Write via vercel env pull The skill documents the `vercel env pull [filename]` command, which allows pulling environment variables from Vercel and writing them to a user-specified file path. If the AI agent allows a malicious user to control the `[filename]` argument without proper validation or sanitization, it could lead to writing sensitive environment variables to arbitrary locations on the agent's filesystem. This could result in data exfiltration (if the file is later read or exfiltrated) or denial of service (by overwriting critical system files). The AI agent should strictly validate and sanitize any user-provided input for the `[filename]` argument when executing `vercel env pull`. It should restrict file writes to a safe, temporary, and isolated directory, or disallow arbitrary file paths entirely to prevent unauthorized file system modifications and data exposure. | LLM | SKILL.md:118 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive path access: Environment file Access to Environment file path detected: '.env.local'. This may indicate credential theft. Verify that access to this sensitive path is justified and declared. | Static | skills/thesethrose/vercel/SKILL.md:120 | |
| MEDIUM | Sensitive path access: Environment file Access to Environment file path detected: '.env.local'. This may indicate credential theft. Verify that access to this sensitive path is justified and declared. | Static | skills/thesethrose/vercel/SKILL.md:129 |
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