Trust Assessment
vikunja received a trust score of 72/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Shell command injection via unquoted variable in `python3 -c` for search parameter, Shell command injection via unquoted variable in `python3 -c` for filter parameter.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 12, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Shell command injection via unquoted variable in `python3 -c` for search parameter The `cmd_tasks` function constructs a URL by embedding the user-controlled `$SEARCH` variable directly into a `python3 -c` command string using single quotes. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary shell commands by crafting input that breaks out of the single-quoted Python string literal (e.g., `foo'bar`) or by using shell command substitution (e.g., `foo$(id)bar`). This can lead to arbitrary code execution on the host system. Pass the `$SEARCH` variable as a command-line argument to the Python script, which handles quoting correctly. For example: `ENCODED_SEARCH=$(python3 -c 'import sys, urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$SEARCH"); URL="${URL}&s=${ENCODED_SEARCH}"`. | LLM | scripts/vikunja.sh:108 | |
| HIGH | Shell command injection via unquoted variable in `python3 -c` for filter parameter Similar to the search parameter, the `cmd_tasks` function constructs a URL by embedding the user-controlled `$FILTER` variable directly into a `python3 -c` command string using single quotes. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary shell commands by crafting input that breaks out of the single-quoted Python string literal or by using shell command substitution. This can lead to arbitrary code execution on the host system. Pass the `$FILTER` variable as a command-line argument to the Python script, which handles quoting correctly. For example: `ENCODED_FILTER=$(python3 -c 'import sys, urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$FILTER"); URL="${URL}&filter=${ENCODED_FILTER}"`. | LLM | scripts/vikunja.sh:112 |
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