Trust Assessment
warren-deploy received a trust score of 85/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval, Unpinned dependency in setup script, Instruction to print private key to console.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 13, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEDIUM | Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions. | Manifest | skills/planetai87/warren-deploy-mainnet/deploy.js:114 | |
| MEDIUM | Unpinned dependency in setup script The `setup.sh` script installs the `ethers` npm package without specifying a version. This makes the skill vulnerable to supply chain attacks if a malicious version of `ethers` is published or if the package is compromised in the future. Without version pinning, the skill might inadvertently install a vulnerable or malicious dependency. Pin the dependency to a specific version (e.g., `npm install ethers@^6.0.0`) or use a `package.json` file with locked versions (via `package-lock.json`) to ensure deterministic and secure installations. | LLM | setup.sh:6 | |
| LOW | Instruction to print private key to console The skill's documentation instructs the user to generate a new wallet and then explicitly print its private key to the console using `console.log('Private Key:', w.privateKey)`. In an automated LLM execution environment, this output could be captured and logged by the LLM, potentially exposing the private key. While intended for user convenience, it creates a direct channel for credential leakage if the execution environment is not secure. Advise users to handle private keys securely, e.g., by storing them directly in environment variables or a secure vault, rather than printing them to standard output. For new wallet generation, suggest outputting only the address and instructing the user to securely store the private key without displaying it. | LLM | SKILL.md:31 |
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