Trust Assessment
xiaohongshu received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 13 findings: 9 critical, 1 high, 3 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Network egress to untrusted endpoints, Arbitrary command execution, Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Manifest Analysis layer scored lowest at 0/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 14, 2026 (commit 13146e6a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings13
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/SKILL.md:104 | |
| CRITICAL | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/SKILL.md:121 | |
| CRITICAL | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/SKILL.md:127 | |
| CRITICAL | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/SKILL.md:177 | |
| CRITICAL | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/SKILL.md:196 | |
| CRITICAL | Network egress to untrusted endpoints HTTP request to raw IP address Review all outbound network calls. Remove connections to webhook collectors, paste sites, and raw IP addresses. Legitimate API calls should use well-known service domains. | Manifest | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/SKILL.md:216 | |
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python dynamic code execution (exec/eval/compile) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/scripts/request/web/encrypt/config.py:16 | |
| CRITICAL | Dangerous call: eval() Call to 'eval()' detected in function 'get'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/scripts/request/web/encrypt/config.py:16 | |
| CRITICAL | Command Injection via eval() in configuration parsing The `Config.get` method in `scripts/request/web/encrypt/config.py` uses `eval()` to parse configuration values from `web_encrypt_config.ini`. If an attacker can modify this INI file (e.g., through a supply chain attack or local file tampering), they can inject arbitrary Python code, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). For example, setting a config value to `__import__('os').system('malicious_command')` would execute the command when `eval` is called. This is a severe vulnerability. Replace `eval()` with `ast.literal_eval()` for parsing Python literals (lists, dicts, numbers, strings, booleans, None) from configuration files. `ast.literal_eval` is a safer alternative as it only evaluates literals and not arbitrary code. | LLM | scripts/request/web/encrypt/config.py:13 | |
| HIGH | Unpinned dependencies in installation instructions The installation instructions in `SKILL.md` specify dependencies (`aiohttp`, `loguru`, `pycryptodome`, `getuseragent`) without pinning their versions. This exposes users to supply chain attacks where a malicious actor could publish a compromised version of one of these packages. When a user installs the skill, `pip` would fetch the latest (potentially malicious) version, leading to arbitrary code execution on the user's system. Pin all dependencies to specific versions (e.g., `aiohttp==3.8.1`, `loguru==0.6.0`) to ensure reproducible and secure installations. Regularly review and update pinned versions to benefit from security patches. | LLM | SKILL.md:14 | |
| MEDIUM | Unsafe deserialization / dynamic eval Decryption followed by code execution Remove obfuscated code execution patterns. Legitimate code does not need base64-encoded payloads executed via eval, encrypted-then-executed blobs, or dynamic attribute resolution to call system functions. | Manifest | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/scripts/request/web/encrypt/cookie/gid_webprofile_data.py:3 | |
| MEDIUM | Potential hardcoded secret (high entropy) A high-entropy string (entropy=5.09) was found in a credential-like context. Verify this is not a hardcoded secret. Use environment variables for sensitive values. | Static | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/scripts/request/web/apis/note.py:153 | |
| MEDIUM | Potential hardcoded secret (high entropy) A high-entropy string (entropy=4.88) was found in a credential-like context. Verify this is not a hardcoded secret. Use environment variables for sensitive values. | Static | skills/chocomintx/xiaohongshutools/scripts/request/web/encrypt/other/XhsFpGenerator.py:243 |
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