Security Audit
robanderson/claude-my-skills:uv-python-manager/skills/uv-python-manager
github.com/robanderson/claude-my-skillsTrust Assessment
robanderson/claude-my-skills:uv-python-manager/skills/uv-python-manager received a trust score of 18/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 4 findings: 2 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Remote code execution: curl/wget pipe to shell, Unpinned remote script execution for UV installation.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. The Static Code Analysis layer scored lowest at 48/100, indicating areas for improvement.
Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit 9961c562). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings4
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Remote code download piped to interpreter Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | uv-python-manager/skills/uv-python-manager/SKILL.md:33 | |
| CRITICAL | Remote code execution: curl/wget pipe to shell Detected a pattern that downloads and immediately executes remote code. This is a primary malware delivery vector. Never pipe curl/wget output directly to a shell interpreter. | Static | uv-python-manager/skills/uv-python-manager/SKILL.md:33 | |
| HIGH | Unpinned remote script execution for UV installation The skill recommends installing UV by piping a remote script (`install.sh` or `install.ps1`) directly to a shell. This method is vulnerable to supply chain attacks if the `astral.sh` domain or its CDN is compromised, as the script's content could be altered to execute arbitrary malicious code on the user's system without prior review or version pinning. This poses a significant risk to users following the installation instructions. Recommend installing UV via a package manager (e.g., Homebrew, Scoop) if available, or by downloading a specific, version-pinned binary with a checksum verification. If remote script execution is necessary, advise users to inspect the script content before execution and consider pinning to a specific version or commit hash if the source supports it. | Static | SKILL.md:30 | |
| MEDIUM | Unpinned Docker image tag for UV binary in Dockerfiles The provided Dockerfile examples use `ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:latest` to copy the UV binary. Using the `:latest` tag means that the image content can change over time, leading to non-reproducible builds and potential introduction of vulnerabilities if the `latest` tag is updated with malicious content or breaking changes. This is a common supply chain risk in containerized environments. Pin the Docker image to a specific, immutable version tag (e.g., `ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.1.23`) or a digest (e.g., `ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv@sha256:abcdef...`) to ensure reproducible and secure builds. | Static | SKILL.md:280 |
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