Security Audit
close-automation
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skillsTrust Assessment
close-automation received a trust score of 73/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Excessive Permissions: Destructive Action Capability, Supply Chain Risk: Unpinned External MCP Dependency.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit e36d6fd3). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Excessive Permissions: Destructive Action Capability The skill grants the AI agent the ability to perform destructive actions, specifically `CLOSE_DELETE_CALL`, which allows permanent deletion of call records. While a legitimate CRM function, this capability, if misused by the LLM (e.g., through a malicious prompt), could lead to irreversible data loss. The skill does not describe any built-in safeguards or confirmation steps for such high-impact operations. Implement explicit confirmation steps or human-in-the-loop approval for destructive actions like `CLOSE_DELETE_CALL`. Consider restricting access to such tools or providing a 'dry run' mode. Ensure the LLM is explicitly instructed on when and how to use such tools responsibly, and to seek user confirmation. | LLM | SKILL.md:109 | |
| HIGH | Supply Chain Risk: Unpinned External MCP Dependency The skill has a direct and unpinned dependency on an external Managed Control Plane (MCP) hosted at `https://rube.app/mcp`. All core functionality of this skill (e.g., `CLOSE_CREATE_LEAD`, `CLOSE_DELETE_CALL`) is provided by this external service. A compromise of `rube.app` or its MCP could lead to the execution of arbitrary malicious code or actions through the tools exposed to the AI agent, without any version pinning or integrity checks defined within the skill itself. Implement mechanisms to verify the integrity and authenticity of external MCPs. If possible, pin dependencies to specific versions or hashes. Regularly audit the security posture of third-party services. Consider sandboxing the execution environment for tools provided by external MCPs. | LLM | SKILL.md:20 |
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