Security Audit

turborepo-caching

github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills

AI SkillCommit e36d6fd3b3f6

CRITICAL

Scanned about 2 months ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

turborepo-caching received a trust score of 47/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 4 findings: 1 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 1 low severity. Key findings include File read + network send exfiltration, Sensitive path access: Environment file, Path Traversal Vulnerability in Self-Hosted Cache Example.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit e36d6fd3). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

70%

Static Code Analysis

93%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

83%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

2 findings

Filesystem Write

3 findings

Shell Execution

2 findings

Excessive Permissions

2 findings

Security Findings4

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
CRITICAL	File read + network send exfiltration .env file access Remove access to sensitive files not required by the skill's stated purpose. SSH keys, cloud credentials, and browser data should never be read by skills unless explicitly part of their declared functionality.	Manifest	skills/turborepo-caching/SKILL.md:66
HIGH	Path Traversal Vulnerability in Self-Hosted Cache Example The provided example for a self-hosted remote cache server (Template 4) constructs file paths using user-controlled input (`req.query.teamId` and `req.params.hash`) directly with `path.join`. While `path.join` normalizes paths, it does not prevent directory traversal if the base directory is relative and the user input contains `../` segments that escape the intended `CACHE_DIR`. An attacker could potentially read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files outside the `./cache` directory by manipulating the `teamId` or `hash` parameters. For example, if `teamId` is `../../../../tmp`, an artifact could be written to `/tmp`. Sanitize user-provided `teamId` and `hash` parameters to ensure they do not contain path traversal sequences (e.g., `../`). A common approach is to validate that these inputs only contain alphanumeric characters or to resolve the path to an absolute path and then verify it remains within the intended `CACHE_DIR` using `path.resolve` and `path.startsWith`.	LLM	SKILL.md:169
MEDIUM	Sensitive path access: Environment file Access to Environment file path detected: '.env.local'. This may indicate credential theft. Verify that access to this sensitive path is justified and declared.	Static	skills/turborepo-caching/SKILL.md:66
LOW	Token Exposure in Self-Hosted Cache Command Example The example command for using a self-hosted cache (`turbo build --api="http://localhost:3000" --token="my-token" --team="my-team"`) demonstrates passing a `token` directly on the command line. While this is a placeholder, in a real-world scenario, passing sensitive tokens as command-line arguments can expose them to other users on the system via process listings (e.g., `ps aux`). Advise users to pass sensitive tokens via environment variables (e.g., `TURBO_TOKEN=my-token turbo build ...`) or secure configuration files, rather than directly on the command line, to prevent exposure in process lists.	LLM	SKILL.md:210

Scan History

Embed Code

[![SkillShield](https://skillshield.io/api/v1/badge/52dd8f3ac0850975.svg)](https://skillshield.io/report/52dd8f3ac0850975)