Security Audit
vercel-deploy-claimable
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skillsTrust Assessment
vercel-deploy-claimable received a trust score of 82/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include User-controlled argument passed to shell script, Potential data exfiltration via command injection.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 20, 2026 (commit e36d6fd3). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings2
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | User-controlled argument passed to shell script The skill's usage instructions indicate that it executes a `bash` script (`/mnt/skills/user/vercel-deploy/scripts/deploy.sh`) and passes a user-controlled `path` argument directly to it. If the `deploy.sh` script does not rigorously sanitize this input before using it in shell commands, it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. An attacker could inject shell metacharacters (e.g., `'; rm -rf /'`) into the `path` argument to execute malicious commands. The `deploy.sh` script must implement robust input sanitization for the `path` argument to prevent shell metacharacters from being interpreted as commands. This can be achieved by using safe methods like `printf %q` for quoting arguments or by ensuring the `path` is only used in contexts where it cannot be interpreted as executable code. Additionally, consider restricting the `path` to a specific, sandboxed directory if possible. | LLM | SKILL.md:30 | |
| MEDIUM | Potential data exfiltration via command injection A successful command injection through the user-controlled `path` argument to `deploy.sh` could allow an attacker to read sensitive files (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, environment variables, or other files on the host system) and exfiltrate them. This could occur by including the file contents in the deployment package, printing them to standard output/error, or sending them to an external service, which might then be captured by the LLM or logging systems. Mitigate the underlying command injection vulnerability by implementing strict input validation and sanitization for the `path` argument in `deploy.sh`. Furthermore, ensure the script operates with the principle of least privilege and within a tightly controlled sandbox environment to limit its access to sensitive files and network resources. | LLM | SKILL.md:30 |
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