Security Audit

sundial-org/awesome-openclaw-skills:skills/1password

github.com/sundial-org/awesome-openclaw-skills

AI SkillCommit 6d998e005da6

CAUTION

Scanned 27 days ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

sundial-org/awesome-openclaw-skills:skills/1password received a trust score of 54/100, placing it in the Caution category. This skill has some security considerations that users should review before deployment.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Potential Command Injection via `tmux send-keys`, Capture of Sensitive Output via `tmux capture-pane`.

The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on March 3, 2026 (commit 6d998e00). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

100%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

78%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Shell Execution

2 findings

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
HIGH	Potential Command Injection via `tmux send-keys` The skill demonstrates the use of `tmux send-keys` to execute commands within a tmux session. While the example uses hardcoded values, if the AI agent generalizes this pattern to include untrusted user input in the command string passed to `send-keys`, it could lead to command injection within the tmux session. An attacker could inject malicious commands by crafting input that breaks out of the intended command structure, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. Explicitly warn the agent about sanitizing any user-provided input before incorporating it into commands passed to `tmux send-keys`. Recommend using a safer method if available, or implementing strict input validation and escaping for all user-controlled parameters.	LLM	SKILL.md:30
MEDIUM	Capture of Sensitive Output via `tmux capture-pane` The skill explicitly uses `tmux capture-pane` to retrieve the output of the tmux session, which includes results from `op signin`, `op whoami`, and `op vault list`. These commands can expose sensitive information such as account details and vault names. Although the skill includes guardrails ("Never paste secrets into logs, chat, or code"), the act of capturing this data into the agent's context creates a direct path for potential data exfiltration if the agent's subsequent handling of this captured output is not perfectly secure (e.g., accidental logging, insecure storage, or transmission). Reinforce the importance of strict handling of captured output. Advise the agent to parse and extract only necessary information, and to immediately redact or discard sensitive data that is not explicitly required for the task. Ensure that any logging or communication channels are secure and do not inadvertently expose this captured data.	LLM	SKILL.md:33

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