Trust Assessment
gh-address-comments received a trust score of 49/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.
SkillShield's automated analysis identified 3 findings: 1 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Dangerous call: subprocess.run(), Skill requests broad GitHub CLI permissions.
The analysis covered 4 layers: Manifest Analysis, Static Code Analysis, Dependency Graph, LLM Behavioral Safety. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.
Last analyzed on February 11, 2026 (commit f4b5c7d6). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.
Layer Breakdown
Behavioral Risk Signals
Security Findings3
| Severity | Finding | Layer | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands. | Manifest | packages/skills-catalog/skills/(development)/gh-address-comments/scripts/fetch_comments.py:96 | |
| HIGH | Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function '_run'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives. | Static | packages/skills-catalog/skills/(development)/gh-address-comments/scripts/fetch_comments.py:96 | |
| MEDIUM | Skill requests broad GitHub CLI permissions The `SKILL.md` explicitly states that `gh` commands should be run with 'elevated network access' and 'escalated permissions (include workflow/repo scopes)'. While the `scripts/fetch_comments.py` only performs read-only operations (`gh pr view`, `gh api graphql`), granting broad `workflow/repo` scopes to the `gh` CLI allows for a wide range of actions (e.g., creating/deleting repositories, issues, PRs, modifying workflows). This creates a risk if the agent is later prompted to use these broad permissions for unintended or malicious actions. The skill could potentially operate with more restricted, read-only GitHub scopes. Restrict the requested GitHub CLI permissions to the minimum necessary for fetching comments (e.g., read-only repository scopes). If the skill truly needs broader permissions for future functionality, clearly document and justify each required scope. | LLM | SKILL.md:5 |
Scan History
Embed Code
[](https://skillshield.io/report/bb37489a58ddf34f)
Powered by SkillShield