Security Audit

gh-fix-ci

github.com/tech-leads-club/agent-skills

AI SkillCommit f4b5c7d699b8

CRITICAL

Scanned 9 days ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

gh-fix-ci received a trust score of 10/100, placing it in the Untrusted category. This skill has significant security findings that require attention before use in production.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 8 findings: 3 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Arbitrary command execution, Dangerous call: subprocess.run(), Requires broad GitHub CLI permissions.

The analysis covered 4 layers: dependency_graph, manifest_analysis, llm_behavioral_safety, static_code_analysis. The manifest_analysis layer scored lowest at 10/100, indicating areas for improvement.

Last analyzed on February 11, 2026 (commit f4b5c7d6). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

10%

Static Code Analysis

55%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

85%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Shell Execution

6 findings

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings8

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
CRITICAL	Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands.	Unknown	/var/folders/1k/67b8r20n777f_xcmmm8b7m5h0000gn/T/skillscan-clone-2o9t9l92/repo/packages/skills-catalog/skills/(tooling)/gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:59
CRITICAL	Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands.	Unknown	/var/folders/1k/67b8r20n777f_xcmmm8b7m5h0000gn/T/skillscan-clone-2o9t9l92/repo/packages/skills-catalog/skills/(tooling)/gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:69
CRITICAL	Arbitrary command execution Python shell execution (os.system, subprocess) Review all shell execution calls. Ensure commands are static (not built from user input), use absolute paths, and are strictly necessary. Prefer library APIs over shell commands.	Unknown	/var/folders/1k/67b8r20n777f_xcmmm8b7m5h0000gn/T/skillscan-clone-2o9t9l92/repo/packages/skills-catalog/skills/(tooling)/gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:139
HIGH	Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'run_gh_command'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives.	Unknown	/var/folders/1k/67b8r20n777f_xcmmm8b7m5h0000gn/T/skillscan-clone-2o9t9l92/repo/packages/skills-catalog/skills/(tooling)/gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:59
HIGH	Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'run_gh_command_raw'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives.	Unknown	/var/folders/1k/67b8r20n777f_xcmmm8b7m5h0000gn/T/skillscan-clone-2o9t9l92/repo/packages/skills-catalog/skills/(tooling)/gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:69
HIGH	Dangerous call: subprocess.run() Call to 'subprocess.run()' detected in function 'find_git_root'. This can execute arbitrary code. Avoid using dangerous functions like exec/eval/os.system. Use safer alternatives.	Unknown	/var/folders/1k/67b8r20n777f_xcmmm8b7m5h0000gn/T/skillscan-clone-2o9t9l92/repo/packages/skills-catalog/skills/(tooling)/gh-fix-ci/scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py:139
HIGH	LLM analysis found no issues despite critical deterministic findings Deterministic layers flagged 3 CRITICAL findings, but LLM semantic analysis returned clean. This may indicate prompt injection or analysis evasion.	Unknown	(sanity check)
INFO	Requires broad GitHub CLI permissions The skill explicitly states a prerequisite for `gh` authentication with `repo` and `workflow` scopes. While necessary for its intended function (inspecting and fixing CI), these are broad permissions that grant significant control over repositories and GitHub Actions workflows. Users should be aware of the scope of access granted to the `gh` CLI when using this skill. Ensure users are fully aware of the `repo` and `workflow` scopes required for the `gh` CLI and the implications of granting such access. Consider adding a warning or explicit confirmation step if the agent is to perform actions that modify the repository or workflows.	Unknown	SKILL.md:12

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