Security Audit

WilsonLiu95/openclaw-skills:skills/seedream-imagegen

github.com/WilsonLiu95/openclaw-skills

AI SkillCommit dacc554a65f5

TRUSTED

Scanned 12 days ago

Critical

Immediate action required

High

Priority fixes suggested

Medium

Best practices review

Low

Acknowledged / Tracked

Trust Assessment

WilsonLiu95/openclaw-skills:skills/seedream-imagegen received a trust score of 87/100, placing it in the Mostly Trusted category. This skill has passed most security checks with only minor considerations noted.

SkillShield's automated analysis identified 2 findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, and 0 low severity. Key findings include Suspicious import: urllib.request, Arbitrary File Exfiltration via Reference Image Upload.

The analysis covered 4 layers: dependency_graph, llm_behavioral_safety, manifest_analysis, static_code_analysis. All layers scored 70 or above, reflecting consistent security practices.

Last analyzed on February 8, 2026 (commit dacc554a). SkillShield performs automated 4-layer security analysis on AI skills and MCP servers.

Layer Breakdown

Manifest Analysis

100%

Static Code Analysis

93%

Dependency Graph

100%

LLM Behavioral Safety

93%

Behavioral Risk Signals

Network Access

2 findings

Filesystem Write

1 finding

Dynamic Code

1 finding

Excessive Permissions

1 finding

Security Findings2

Severity	Finding	Layer	Location
MEDIUM	Suspicious import: urllib.request Import of 'urllib.request' detected. This module provides network or low-level system access. Verify this import is necessary. Network and system modules in skill code may indicate data exfiltration.	Unknown	/tmp/skillscan-clone-jczz7k9m/repo/skills/seedream-imagegen/scripts/generate_image.py:12
MEDIUM	Arbitrary File Exfiltration via Reference Image Upload The `encode_image_to_base64` function reads any local file path provided via the `--images` argument and sends its content (base64 encoded) to the external Volcengine API. The function relies solely on file extensions for MIME type determination and lacks content validation (e.g., magic bytes check). An attacker could use prompt injection to trick the agent into selecting sensitive local files (e.g., SSH keys, configuration files) as 'reference images', resulting in the exfiltration of sensitive data to the third-party API. Implement file content validation (e.g., check magic bytes for JPEG/PNG/WEBP) before reading the full file. Restrict allowed file paths to specific directories if possible.	Unknown	scripts/generate_image.py:56

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